ABSTRACT In order to facilitate the energy sharing in Smart Building Cluster, a hybrid energy sharing framework with combined heat and power (CHP) system and photovaltic (PV) prosumers is proposed. A coalitional game model with a utility function that captures the benefit of coalition is built, in which CHP is a thermal and electrical energy producer, and PV prosumers act as role-exchangeable energy sellers or buyers. To minimize the operation cost of the coalition, the demand response is integrated with the coalitional game, in which prosumers can adjust their flexible thermal and electrical loads simultaneously. To support the coalitional game, a two-level reward allocation scheme is designed for fairness of participants and reduction of computational complexity. Moreover, a distributed optimal algorithm based on alternating direction method of multipliers is used to solve the hybrid energy sharing problem. Finally, the effectiveness of the method is verified via a practical case. Scheduling results show that the energy consumption behaviors with both heat and power can be adjusted by prosumers to minimize the coalitional cost, including a heatpower interactive characteristic in particular. The costs of prosumers are reduced while the profit of CHP is improved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy production and consumption are essential factors for establishing a Smart Building Cluster with high efficiency and sustainability [1] . In some areas, heating of buildings is a rigid demand for the users, the application of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) systems [2] can provide the thermal and electrical energy for end users simultaneously, with much higher efficiency and superior environmental friendliness compared to traditional energy productions. For example, in China, in order to solve the air pollution caused by coalfired boilers, an energy policy has been in place for changing fuel from coal to natural gas. The CHP is regarded as a core component to realize the goal and enhance the energy efficiency. Moreover, the distributed Photovaltic (PV) system [3] is also developing very fast, which has been usually installed on the rooftop of buildings. For the above reasons, there emerges a new type of smart energy building cluster with local CHP system and PV prosumers. In order to achieve the potential efficiency and improve renewable energy consumption, the hybrid energy sharing management with both electricity and heat is an important problem to be addressed.
Until recently, numerous studies have been done on the energy management of hybrid systems with CHP and renewable energy sources (RESs), which can be roughly divided into two aspects. One is focusing on the optimal operation of CHP systems [4] , [5] . Generally, two common operating strategies are utilized in the CHP system: following electric load (FEL) and following thermal load (FTL) [6] , the strategies selection is up to the primary energy requirements of the users. Recently, following a hybrid electricthermal load (FHL) is also introduced for the scenario with time varying electric and thermal load [7] . In the operation, the optimization goals are commonly set as maximizing the energy efficiency or minimizing the operation cost [8] .
The other is on the operation of a microgrid containing CHP and various types of RESs [9] . The involving components may include CHP, wind turbine (WT), PV, and energy storage (ES) [10] . Compared with the operation of an independent CHP system, the environmental benefits (i.e., the carbon emission and consumption percentage of RESs) are also considered as important factors. Thus the multi-objective optimization was used to solve the optimal operations [11] .
In Smart Grid, PV Prosumer is a new entity who can either act as a power consumer or a producer during different time periods [12] , [13] . In the building cluster level, the energy trading between neighbouring prosumers can be seen as a sharing of renewable energy, which has been proved as a feasible way to improve the local consumption of PV energy and lower the negative impacts on the utility grid [14] , [15] . An important feature is that each prosumer is a rational and autonomous entity, who can participate in the energy sharing with the own optimization goal. Thus, Demand Response (DR) is always coherent with the energy sharing for largely improving the PV energy consumption. Considering the heating of buildings is rigid requirements in many regions, the energy demands of PV prosumers are not only the electricity, but also the thermal load. With the cooperation of CHP system, it is feasible to extend the current form of energy sharing into a hybrid energy sharing with both heat and electricity. As the CHP system and PV prosumers belong to different entities, the hybrid energy sharing of multiparty energy management is a new problem, which is different from the existing literature, to the most extent of our knowledge.
Coalitional game has shown a great potential to solve problems in Smart Grid, e.g., multi-microgrid [16] , [17] , direct trading [18] , and nanogrids [19] . However, in these studies, the cooperation is mainly conducted between sellers and buyers, or only sellers, electricity is the only type of energy involved. In this paper, the coalition may include one energy seller, and several role-exchangeable sellers/buyers, the thermal and electrical energy are two different types of energy coordinated shared in the system, which have tight coupling in the production aspect.
To this end, the focus of this paper is on the hybrid energy sharing problem of smart energy building cluster with CHP system and PV prosumers. The contributions are as follows.
1) Considering thermal energy storage (TES), a hybrid energy sharing framework is established for the cooperation of CHP operator and PV prosumers, in which the CHP is a thermal and electrical energy producer, and PV prosumers are acted as role-exchangeable energy sellers or buyers.
2) A DR-integrated coalitional game model is built to minimize the coalitional operation cost, with the consideration of local electricity sharing among prosumers, the thermal energy sharing between CHP and prosumers, and the energy consumption behaviors of prosumers. In particular, an entirely new heat-power interactive characteristic is included in DR. Two-level reward allocation scheme is designed to measure the contributions from the CHP operator and PV prosumers.
3) A distributed algorithm is designed to solve the coalitional energy management using the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM). The submitted information of prosumers to CHP operator is limited to expected amount of power and heat, which protects the privacy of prosumers.
II. ENERGY SHARING FRAMEWORK WITH THERMAL AND ELECTRICAL ENERGY
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE The energy sharing structure of the smart building cluster with a CHP and PV prosumers is shown in Fig.1 , which can be expressed in a Cyber-Physical system perspective [20] . The physical system includes microturbine, TES, PV, electric and thermal loads, as well as two types of energy distribution lines. The cyber system includes energy management systems of CHP (CHP-EMS) and prosumers (UEMS), and the communication networks among them. In this structure, the optimal scheduling of each prosumer is implemented in the UEMS, which decides power consumption, heat consumption, trading electricity, etc. Similarly, the optimal scheduling of CHP system is implemented in the CHP-EMS, which decides the generated power and heat, and the input/output thermal energy in the TES. With the consideration of TES, the rigid constraint of FTL mode of CHP is changed, which improves the flexibility. If the CHP produces excess heat, the remaining part is stored in the TES. Otherwise, if there is a shortage of heat, TES can release heat for prosumers. 
B. OPERATION MODE
Generally, the CHP and PV prosumers can all be operated in an independent mode, which means their electricity should be traded with the utility grid, and the heat of PV prosumers is provided by the CHP. For the prosumers, if the PV energy cannot be consumed, the excess part should be fed to the utility grid; otherwise, if the PV energy is insufficient, they should purchase the electricity from the utility grid. For the CHP, the generated electricity is all fed to the utility grid at a fixed price, and the generated heat is provided to the contracted prosumers.
Different from the independent mode, by using the energy sharing framework, the CHP operator and PV prosumers can form an alliance and work in a cooperative mode. On the one hand, self-produced energy is utilized as the first priority to meet the own power load of prosumers, and then, the electricity of CHP system and the excess electricity of prosumers can be shared in the coalition. If the shared electricity is surplus or insufficient for the local load demand, the coalition can act as an entity to trade it with the utility grid. Since feedin tariff of electricity is lower than the purchasing price from the utility grid as usual, the prosumers and CHP operator will be interested in participating in the coalition to reduce their operation cost. On the other hand, the heat produced by the CHP system would be provided to all the prosumers in the coalition. In order to further minimize the total cost the coalition, DR with both electricity and heat can be utilized to change the energy consumption behaviors of the prosumers.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Micro-turbine generator (MTG) is a kind of small scale turbine generation unit with power range from a few dozen kilowatts to several megawatts. Its fuel cost can be described as [12] :
where C chp denotes fuel cost of MTG; C CH 4 is the price of natural gas; η chp is generation efficiency of MTG; t is the length of time slot; P chp is the electric power of MTG; L HVNG is low calorific value of natural gas. The relationship between electric power and heat is:
where H chp and P chp denote heat and electric power of MTG, respectively; η L is the heat loss coefficient; C oph is coefficient of heating; η h is recovery rate of fuel gas.
2) TES
Considering the mismatch of electric load and thermal load, the CHP may not be fully put into operation due to the rigid rule of FTL or FEL. TES is considered to be well coordinated with CHP unit while satisfying the various electric and thermal load demands [21] . The heat loss of TES can be characterized in the process of heat storage and release, which is reflected in state equation of energy content:
where Q t tes denotes energy content of TES at time slot t; H t in is injected heat to TES at time slot t; H t dr is drawn heat from TES at time slot t; η in and η dr are the injecting and drawing heat efficiencies, respectively.
Since the attenuation coefficient is usually very small, (3) can be linearized:
The constraints of maximum limitations of injecting and drawing heat (H max in and H max dr ) of TES in each time slot are expressed by (5) . In addition, TES energy content is restrained by (6) .
where Q min tes and Q max tes are the minimum and maximum energy content of TES, respectively.
3) COST OF CHP OPERATOR
In cooperative mode, the CHP operator provides electricity and heat for prosumers and sells excess electricity to utility grid. The cost of CHP operator mainly includes: i) fuel cost of CHP system; ii) profit of trading electricity with utility grid; iii) profit of providing heat for prosumers; iv) profit of providing electricity for prosumers. Then the cost of CHP operator C ope can be expressed as: (8) where P gb is the unit buying price of utility grid; P pro is the electricity sold by CHP to PV prosumers; H pro is the heat sold by CHP to PV prosumers; γ and λ are unit prices of heat and electricity trading between CHP and prosumers, respectively; x chp,s denotes the electricity sold by CHP to utility grid; H tes is injected or drawn heat of TES (H tes = −H in for injected heat; H tes = H dr for drawn heat); C chp (P chp , H chp ) is cost function of CHP, as shown in (1) and (2).
B. MODEL OF PV PROSUMERS 1) ELECTRICAL LOAD
Since there is a certain proportion of shiftable load, prosumers have ability to do DR. According to [22] , the load adjustment is linear with economic benefits. Similarly, the power consumption utility u n of prosumer n can be expressed as u n = a n x n + b n (9) where x n is the power consumption of prosumer n (kWh); a n and b n are utility parameters of prosumer n, which vary with the different power consumption behaviors. In the DR, the power consumption of prosumers can be adjusted to maximize their utilities, however, there always been a upper and lower bound for each prosumer, which can be expressed as x min n ≤ x n ≤ x max n . Moreover, the output power of PV system is decided by the capacity and external environment. In the optimal energy management, it is necessary to forecast the PV power P PV ,n of each time slot. Thus, during the operation periods, the roles of prosumer n are decided by the value of x n −P PV ,n , positive for buyer and negative for seller.
2) THERMAL LOAD
According to [23] , the state equation of indoor temperature is modeled as follow.
where R is thermal resistance of building; T t in and T t out denote indoor and outdoor temperatures at time slot t, respectively; C air is air specific heat. Generally, in a building, for given R, T t in , T t out and C air , the expected indoor temperature T t+1 in is approximately proportional to the input heat H t air .
3) DISCOMFORT COST
According to [24] , the feeling of discomfort is quantified by multiplying the deviation of the indoor temperature T n in outside setting comfort temperature T t set with a coefficient β n , the equivalent cost inc n of discomfort of prosumer n can be expressed as
where β n is the sensitivity coefficient of prosumer n, which is used to quantify the willingness to adjust the indoor temperature. For the selection of β n (β n > 0), the larger value indicates that prosumer n is more sensitive to discomfort caused by temperature changes and has less willingness to adjust temperature.
Denoting that Q T n in
and Q T set are the required heat for achieving indoor temperatures T n in and T set respectively, by substituting (10) into (11), (11) can be reformulated as
where α n = β n R(1 − e −1/RC air ).
4) COST OF PROSUMERS
For each prosumer, the objective function takes both economy and the willingness of DR into consideration, which includes: i) cost/revenue of trading with the utility grid; ii) equivalent discomfort cost caused by the adjustment of flexible thermal load; iii) power consumption utility; iv) cost of purchasing heat from CHP; v) cost of purchasing electricity from CHP; vi) cost/revenue of trading with other prosumers. During the operation periods, the roles of prosumers can be changed according to their net electric power, i.e., C + n is operation cost of prosumer n in buyer role and C − n is operation cost of prosumer n in seller role. (14) where P gs is the unit selling price of the utility grid; P pro,n denotes the power sold by CHP to prosumer n; H pro,n denotes the heat sold by CHP to prosumer n; x in n denotes the shared power of prosumer n with other prosumers; ξ represents the price of shared power among prosumers.
IV. COALITIONAL GAME MODEL A. COALITIONAL GAME OF THE SMART ENERGY BUILDING CLUSTER
Coalitional game is a branch of game theory which studies whether a group of players can be better off if they decide to take part in an alliance. A coalitional game is characterized by (N , v) , where N is the set of players and v is the value function which quantifies the worth of a coalition. In this paper, N denotes the union set of CHP operator and all the prosumers in a building cluster. The participated CHP operator and prosumers form a coalition S ⊂ N with value function v(S). Compared with the independent mode, the cost of coalition S will reduce under the cooperative mode, and the value function v(S) can be defined as:
where C i (S) is the total cost of all players in the independent mode; C c (S) denotes the total cost of all players in coalition S in the cooperative mode. Note that, it is clear for any coalition S ⊂ N to form, it should have at least one CHP and one prosumer.
In the cooperative mode, the objective function C c is:
where N B and N S are the sets of buyers and sellers, respectively. During the operation, the roles of prosumers are dynamically decided by their own netload and incentive of DR. Thus, in each time slot, the group member of sellers and buyers are not constant. By substituting (7), (13) , and (14) into (16), the operating cost of coalition S can be obtained, which includes four parts: 1) the cost of trading with utility grid; 2) the cost of CHP; 3) the equivalent discomfort cost; 4) power consumption utility.
where (x) + = max(x, 0). In this context, the purpose of DR model is to minimize the cost of the cooperative mode. As shown in (17), the power and heat consumption variables {x n , Q T n in } can be controlled by each prosumer, and finally could have influence on the cost.
In the independent mode, we have:
where C ope,i is operation cost of CHP in independent mode; C n,i is operation cost of prosumer n in independent mode. Next, we show that forming the grand alliance is optimal for the CHP operator and prosumers in view of maximizing the value function. In other words, it is always beneficial for the CHP operator and prosumers to join the coalition. Then the superadditivity of the value function is defined as follow.
Definition 1: If for any S, T ∈ 2 N , and S∩T = ∅, we have
Theorem 1: If the total heat demand of the prosumers can be provided by the CHP system, the studied coalitional game (N , v) is superadditive.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Due to superadditivity of this coalitional game, forming the grand coalition is optimal for CHP operator and prosumers in a building cluster to minimize the operation cost. That is, the reward is increased for CHP operator and prosumers under coalitional game compared with the independent mode. The cost shared by each participant in the alliance is less than the cost of leaving the coalition. As a result, the CHP operator and prosumers are willing to participate in the coalition.
Moreover, we adopt the concept of the core, which is defined as the feasible allocation of reward which cannot be further improved by dividing the grand coalition into subsets. If the core of the game is non-empty, there exists a feasible way to divide reward among the participants in which no group of prosumers has incentive to quit the coalition, that is, the grand coalition is stable.
Theorem 2: The core of the studied coalitional game (N , v) is non-empty, if and only if P gs ≥ P gb .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
B. REWARD ALLOCATION SCHEME
It is demonstrated in Theorem 1 that the proposed game will result in increased revenues for the whole group of players. Generally, the Shapley value can be considered as a measure of the contribution made by each player to the coalition. However, the computational complexity of the Shapley value grows significantly in games with a large number of players [25] , [26] . Therefore, in this paper, a two-level reward allocation scheme is designed. Although the PV prosumers can act as different roles during the operation time, the role would finally be decided as the seller or the buyer for each time slot. Then we have N = {CHP, N B , N S }. That is, there are eventually three groups of participants in the coalitional game, and their contributions to the coalition are achieved by energy sharing. Thus, we can design the first level distribution scheme based on the Shapley value among the three groups of participants.
where φ i (v) is the Shapley value of group i in N ; S ⊂ N \{i} means the set of group except player group i with value function v(S ); |S | denotes the number of player groups in S ; N is the number of player groups in N . The second level distribution is conducted among the same type of prosumers, which do not have energy sharing among them. In the group of sellers or buyers, the contribution of each prosumer is achieved by adjusting the energy consumption behaviors for DR. Thus, the reward of prosumers with the same role can be allocated according to their marginal contributions [27] to the group. A fair billing mechanism is given as 
V. DISTRIBUTED OPTIMAL SCHEDULING ALGORITHM
The optimization problem in the cooperative mode can be converted into the standard form of ADMM [28] :
where C pro = n∈N B C + n + n∈N S C − n ; P exp and H exp denote expected power and heat of prosumers, respectively; P pro and H pro denote provided power and heat from CHP, respectively. Following to system balance of power and heat, the variables are constrained by the following equations and (8) . (27) where x grid,n is the trading electricity of prosumer n with the utility grid.
According to the basic principle of ADMM, the iteration form of the distributed algorithm can be expressed as 
where ε pri and ε dual are convergence error of primal residual and dual residual, respectively. The distribution algorithm should be implemented between the CHP operator and PV prosumers, in each round of iteration, the prosumers submit the total expected power and heat to the CHP operator by solving (28) , and then the CHP operator responses the provided power and heat to the prosumers by solving (29) . Lagrange multipliers are updated independently by the CHP operator and prosumers. In order to facilitate the interaction process, the PV energy sharing cloud [29] can be used to act as an agent for all the participated prosumers. The cloud takes charge of minimizing the operation cost of registered prosumers and only uploading the information of total expected amount of power and heat to the CHP operator.
VI. CASE STUDY A. BASIC DATA
In this paper, a MG consisting of 6 residential buildings (named as P1 to P6) and a CHP operator is considered in the case study. All the load data are collected from the smart meters of the residential buildings in Beijing. A typical day in winter is selected for numerical experiments, and the length of each time slot is set as one hour. The aggregated PV output power, electrical load, net electrical load and thermal load of prosumers are given in Fig.2 . P gb and P gs are set as 0.35 CNY/kWh and 0.5 CNY/kWh, respectively. Primal residual and dual residual of the algorithm are all set as 1E-2. η chp , η L , L HVNG and C CH 4 are set as 0.37, 0.03, 9.7kW · h/m 3 and 1.4 CNY/kWh, respectively. The rated output electric power of CHP is 500 kW, and the energy content of TES is 250 kWh. The initial content of TES is 50kWh. The PV capacity and α n of prosumer n are set as Table. 1. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIMAL SCHEDULING RESULTS
For the CHP operator side, the electrical and thermal energy scheduling results are shown in Fig. 3 . The results show that the operation status of CHP can be categorized as two types: i) In time slots 1-3, 12-13 and 16-18, CHP operates in FEL, in which there is thermal energy injected or drawn by TES; ii) in time slots 4-11, 14-15 and 19-24, CHP operates in FTL. When the CHP operates in FEL, the TES can be used to keep the thermal energy balance. For instance, the superfluous thermal energy is injected into TES in time slots 1-3, and then drawn from TES to provide thermal demand of prosumers in time slots 12-13. The reasons mainly include two aspects. First, when there is the lack of PV energy, the coalitional operation cost can be reduced by generating more electricity from the CHP. Second, when the PV energy is excess, the CHP generates less electricity, and thus the coalitional operation cost can also be reduced by increasing the consumption of PV energy. In these processes, TES can alleviate the contradiction between electrical load and thermal load, achieving a unified and coordinated energy management of electricity and heat.
For the PV prosumers side, the electrical and thermal energy scheduling results are shown in Figs. 4 and 5 , respectively. The DR model designed for the coalitional game are influenced on both power and heat consumption. In Fig. 4 , the results show that the prosumers are actively changed the power consumption behavior to achieve a lower cost or better revenue during different time slots. First, when the PV energy is sufficient (i.e., time slots 10-16), most of the prosumers are increasing their power consumptions. That is, the buyers purchase more PV energy while the sellers sell less PV energy. These behaviors lead to improvement of PV energy consumption, and finally minimize the operation cost of the coalition. Note that in these time slots, several prosumers have changed the roles by using the DR, e.g., time slot 12 of P1, P2 and P4. In order to consume more PV energy, the role of these prosumers are changed from seller to buyer. Second, when the PV energy is insufficient (i.e., time slots 0-9 and 17-23), all the prosumers are acted as buyers. In this regard, they have to reduce power consumption, so as to minimize the operation cost of the coalition.
Moreover, in Fig. 5 , the results of the DR on thermal energy consumption can be concluded in three aspects.
First, the results show that the prosumers have increased the heat consumptions in time slots 0-9 and 17-23, which are different from the common sense of DR on temperature control (i.e., if we want to reduce the cost, the direct action is to lower the indoor temperature for less heat consumptions). Having insight into this phenomenon, we think this is mainly due to the heat and power coupling on CHP side. As we know, in CHP system, more generated heat means the higher electric power output. The price of electricity from the CHP operator is much lower than the utility grid, which could finally minimize the operation cost of the coalition, even with more cost on CHP fuel. Thus, in this paper, we can name this new type of DR as "Heat-Power Interactive DR".
Second, in contrast, during time slots 10-16, the prosumers do not purchase more heat and even try reduce the heat consumption (e.g., time slots 15-16 of P1, P4, and P5). As there are sufficient PV energy in these time slots, it is not economical to active the heat-power interactive DR to increase the power output of CHP system. Considering the heat and power coupling of CHP, the CHP operator also decides to produce less electrical energy due to the reduction of thermal power, which avoids selling excess electricity to the utility grid uneconomically.
Third, the comfortable level of the prosumers has been influenced by deviation of setting temperature. The degree of deviations is mainly decided by the willingness coefficient of different prosumers. For example, P3 is very sensitive to the temperature change with a largest α = 0.06, thus the equivalent discomfort cost is highest among all the prosumers. To reduce total operation cost, the least deviation of adjusted temperature is optimized for P3.
C. REWARD ALLOCATION RESULTS
Based on distributed optimal results shown in Fig.4 , the roles of prosumers in different time slots are shown in Table. 2. According to the reward allocation scheme in Section IV. Part B, the increased revenues of the participating players in the coalition in a day are listed in Table 3 . The results show that the sum of reward allocated by all players is equal to total increased revenue of coalition. Through the hybrid energy sharing, the prosumers can reduce their energy utilization cost and the revenue of CHP is also improved, which achieves the win-win situation of all players in the coalitional game. 
D. COMPUTATION EFFICIENCY OF THE OPTIMAL DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
To clarify the efficiency of proposed optimal distributed algorithm, we use a personal computer with Intel Core i7-6700K CPU 4.0GHz, 8G memory, and Matlab 2015b, as the testing environment. The algorithm can achieve convergence in 30-50 iterations for most time slots, the computation time of each time slot is given in Table 4 . The results show that the algorithm can be converged in 213.52s at longest, which can be easily implemented before the decision of each time slot (an hour). 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a hybrid energy sharing framework based on coalitional game is proposed for smart building cluster with CHP system and PV prosumers. First, we have shown that CHP can be dynamically operated as FTL or FEL mode, according to the net power and thermal demand. Moreover, we have shown that the prosumers are possible to change the energy consumption behaviors with both heat and power, so as to minimize the coalitional cost. Two types of DR activities are drawn from the results: i) if the PV energy is surplus, the prosumers can increase the power consumption and reduce the heat consumption; ii) if the PV energy is insufficient, the prosumers can decrease the power consumption and increase heat consumption. In addition, PV prosumers can act as role-exchangeable energy sellers or buyers. For the second type, it is a new type of heat-power interactive DR, which can increase power generation of CHP through the increment of heat consumption and finally achieve the purpose of reducing operation cost. The hybrid energy sharing management is implemented based on ADMM, in which only the limited information (e.g., expected amount of power and heat) is submitted by prosumers to CHP. Thus the privacy of prosumers is protected. Finally, to support the billing of the coalitional game, a two-level reward allocation scheme is designed. The results show that the costs of prosumers are reduced while the revenue of CHP is improved.
The proposed work can be extended in various ways. An interesting extension would be taking electrical energy storage into account of the model. Considering the distance between CHP and prosumers, the power loss and heat loss For arbitrary two sets S, T ∈ 2 N , S ∩ T = ∅, we have
It can be simplified as
In (37), the inequality is due to the convexity of C(·) and Jensen inequality. Morever, C(·) is segmental linear function, thus the equality is established. Similarly, the second item, the third item and the fourth item of cost function accord with Definition 1. We find that the cost function decreases if arbitrary two sets are combined into one set. Therefore, if the total heat demand of the prosumers can be provided by the CHP system, the studied coalitional game (N , v) is superadditive.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF THE THEOREM 2
Proof: Bondareva-Shapley theorem is adopted to proof the aforementioned theorem [30] . Let P(i) be the set of all the subsets in N containing element i, that is, for any N ∈ P, we have i ∈ N . Then P is the power set of N , which is set of all subsets. From Bondareva-Shapley theorem, we know that if and only if for each function g(N ) in which N ∈P(i) g(N ) = 1 and 0 ≤ g(N ) ≤ 1 for ∀i ∈ N , the following inequality is satisfied:
the core of this game is non-empty [18] . First, consider the case when P gs ≥ P gb , P m is introduced which satisfies P gb ≤ P m ≤ P gs . Then we have 
In above (40), equality (1) comes from reorganizing the order of formula. Besides, (2) is established due to property of g (·) , that is, N ∈P(i) g(N ) = 1. Morever, (3) is got according to P m = P gs and i∈N x i ≥ 0. Similarly, we obtain the same conclusion by assuming i∈N x i < 0 and P m = P gs . Therefore, according to Bondareva-Shapley theorem, the core of this game is non-empty if P gs ≥ P gb .
Next, let P gs < P gb , and we assume way, the remaining items of objective function are in accordance with Bondareva-Shapley theorem. In short, the core of considered game is non-empty if P gs ≥ P gb . In a reasonable electricity market, we have P gs ≥ P gb . According to Theorem 2, the considered game in this paper is non-empty. Therefore, there is a feasible allocation of revenue for participants in considered game. Participants have incentive to take part in the grand coalition, furthermore, the grand coalition is stable. 
